Endnote 1

Various Counter-arguments to the Proof from Tzaddikim

One of the most common counter-arguments that I hear, is that maybe the people who retell such stories are not reliable. The problem with that argument is that it isn’t true.

History, in the sense of what actually happened in previous times, is very black and white – either something happened or it did not. It is not as if we can come to a gentlemen’s agreement, where one of us will decide that something did happen, while the other will decide that it didn’t, and both of us would be correct. So whatever conclusion that one person reaches, if it is true, should be as valid for the other as well.

The problem that I am faced with, is that I personally know many of the people that relate these stories, and they are reliable people. Let’s take, for example, my father, who personally experienced a number of miracles involving the Rebbe, although I haven’t mentioned them here. I know my father as an adult for many years by now, and if I want to be honest with myself, I must concede that he is not making it up. A similar situation exists with the first nine stories that I've linked to above – with the exception of the third story – where I either know the people themselves, or my father knows the people themselves, or they are family-related – and in each of those cases I know with certainty that the story they retell is reliable.

If I were to decide to reject their stories nevertheless, wouldn’t that make me intellectually dishonest? Wouldn’t I be violating the principle that ‘one must always base their conclusions on reality, and not base reality on their conclusions’? 

A second counter-argument is a statistical one – that if we would accumulate all of the stories regarding the Rebbe, then the miracle stories would be explainable by statistical chance. Again, this isn’t true for at least two reasons:

1. I have looked into this at length with others, and the numbers are simply unexplainable. Even when only considering “positive” stories of dire one-in-a-hundred cases where the Rebbe was right, which should mean that there are many other “negative” stories where the Rebbe was wrong, the ratio that we managed to come to was so minuscule that it is simply not statistically explainable.

2. On a micro level, there are some people who do have the full picture of the positive and negative stories, and they are the rabbis of various Lubavitcher communities. As being the son of a rabbi, I have noticed just how much congregants confide in their rabbi – sometimes even personal problems that they don’t share even with their own family members. So the rabbi would know if a person in their community had a problem; if they wrote to the Rebbe about it; if, and what, the Rebbe answered; if that person followed the advice; and if the problem was resolved. The problem I am faced with, is that I personally know three Lubavitcher rabbis who are truthful people and internally consistent – I am certain that if they were to come to the conclusion that this was all statistically explainable, and that the Rebbe was not able to perform miracles, then they would tell their congregants exactly that. I cannot explain why these three rabbis are still certain in their belief that the Rebbe was able to perform miracles, if not that it is actually true.

A third counter-argument is to say that maybe the community involved has a mentality where people overly embellish the stories, and the like. Again, I know that this cannot be the explanation, as I have lived within Lubavitcher communities throughout my life, and this argument simply does not measure up with reality. This is in addition to the fact that many people involved in these stories do not come from a Lubavitcher background.

Finally, there is a fourth counter-argument made from the writings of David Hume, who argues that logically we should not accept testimony in support of the supernatural. His arguments can be found here: http://www.davidhume.org/texts/ehu.php#E10

Hume first presents a general argument, and then four specific ones, which can be summarized as follows:

A piece of evidence in support of the supernatural, goes against the large body of evidence that we already, and constantly, have to the contrary, that only the natural exists. One can give an analogy to the Indian prince who while in his homeland never came across the phenomenon of water turning into ice, who then comes across a piece of ice on a world travel and rejects its existence because it goes against all of his previous experiences.

In addition, a) the people who retell miraculous occurrences are generally not reliable, b) they take great pleasure in retelling such wondrous stories, making them even more unreliable, c) the miraculous events usually happened to primitive, naïve and barbaric peoples and d) there is a logical contradiction if two religions report claims of their leaders performing miracles, as is often the case, as most religions make the claim that they are exclusively true and all other religions are false.

In response to the general argument, I might understand if our Indian prince would not accept the reality that water turns into ice at certain temperatures, if he only came across one instance of ice in all of his travels. But if the prince came across more than 500 instances of ice, and still did not believe in its existence, then that is, frankly, inexcusable.

As for the objections made in a, b and c, they do not apply to our case, as these people are reliable, they often do not take great pleasure in recounting their stories, although some of them do, and they are neither primitive nor naïve. They are not barbarians either.

About the fourth point, Judaism has a very interesting answer:

If it were only true that Tzaddikim were able to perform miracles, then that would prevent people from having free choice, as people would be forced to go to Tzaddikim to find respite for their problems. Therefore G-d allows other people to use the power of magic to override nature, in order to restore free choice.

Before I continue, I should clarify something about Maimonides' opinion, as many people will immediately object by pointing out that Maimonides writes very strongly against the existence of magic.

I will respond by pointing out that firstly, despite what he writes about magic, Maimonides certainly believed in the existence of miracles, and secondly, it would seem that even Maimonides was of the opinion that in certain circumstances, magic can exist. I base that on what he writes in chapter eight of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, where he explains that the giving of the Torah is the sole proof of the truth of our religion. He writes (8:1): The Jews did not believe in Moses, our teacher, because of the wonders that he performed. Whenever anyone's belief is based on wonders, [the commitment of] his heart has shortcomings, because it is possible to perform a wonder through magic or sorcery. All the wonders performed by Moses in the desert were not intended to serve as proof [of the legitimacy] of his prophecy, but rather were performed for a purpose. It was necessary to drown the Egyptians, so he split the sea and sank them in it. We needed food, so he provided us with manna. We were thirsty, so he split the rock [providing us with water]. Korach's band mutinied against him, so the earth swallowed them up. The same applies to the other wonders. What is the source of our belief in him? The [revelation] at Mount Sinai. Our eyes saw, and not a stranger's. Our ears heard, and not another's. There was fire, thunder, and lightning. He entered the thick clouds; the Voice spoke to him and we heard, "Moses, Moses, go tell them the following:...."

If it were true that magic can only create an illusion, as Maimonides writes elsewhere, how can it be claimed that the splitting of the sea, where the people walked through on dry land, was performed through magic? That definitely wasn’t an illusion. Furthermore, why does Maimonides have to devote this entire chapter, bringing a proof from G-d’s revelation at Sinai, if he could give a simpler argument: since magic can only create an illusion, and Moses split the sea which wasn’t an illusion, therefore that must mean that our religion is true, because only a servant of G-d would be able to perform a true miracle.

From the above, it would seem that Maimonides held that at least in certain circumstances, magic can exist.

The above explains why in Tanach, as well as in the Mishnah and Gemara, there are many references to witchcraft, as in those times people were able to perform magic. This was because there were miracles happening at that time as well (see Avot 5:5).

This would also explain why the possibility of other people performing supernatural feats is not a contradiction to our religion, as our religion specifically allows for that to occur, in order for people to retain free choice.

At this point, I usually get the counter-argument that maybe the people I consider to be Tzaddikim, are really the ones performing witchcraft, and therefore maybe Judaism isn’t the correct religion after all.

In response, I’ll first point out that if one concedes the existence of magic, that also must confirm my first conclusion, that G-d, in a general sense, must exist. In addition, the truth of our religion can be proven from a) the additional logical proof that I discuss, the Kuzari proof; b) the arguments made based on Tefillin and Mezuzos which was mentioned above, which are not contingent on the abilities of Tzadikkim. There are stories where similar things happened to people even though they didn’t ask a Tzaddik if their Tefillin was kosher or not; and c) the argument of the Tzemach Tzedek of Lubavitch in his Sefer Hachakira (pg. 128) that magic isn’t completely identical to the powers that Tzaddikim have, as there are some miracles, such as Joshua’s stopping of the sun, that cannot be performed through magic.