26 Exegesis of the Torah

The Oral Torah and the Halacha -- II

Chazal's exegesis of the Torah must be rationally analyzed

So tradition, dear to us as it may be, is too vague to base our faith upon or to provide authority for practical Halacha. To Maimonides, celebrating Shavuot 50 days after the first day of Passover is most certainly "traditional exegesis" (see Maimonides, Laws of Permanent and Additional Sacrifices 7:11 and 8:1), and this practice should be shared by all the Jewish communities worldwide -- yet the tradition of Beta Israel does not include such a law, nor the way it is learnt from the Torah; instead it states that Shavuot should be celebrated 50 days after the last day of Passover. So we see that based on reason and factual reality, the category of "traditional exegesis" has no value based only on support from tradition; it should be examined together with the category of Oral Torah laws I have not yet mentioned -- "the laws derived rationally and there was disagreement about them... and in these matters the law is determined by the majority."

But if these laws are derived rationally from the Torah text, as Maimonides stated, then one should examine the arguments which led the Sages to formulate these laws. If the arguments are reasonable then it is understandable that the laws derive their authority from the Torah -- but if the arguments make no sense, what connection is there between the Torah and the laws that Sages formulated based on these arguments?

Did the Sages have Divine authority to interpret the Torah?

The most popular answer to the question above is: since the Torah itself gives the Sages the authority to interpret it as they see fit, all the laws they make -- be their arguments for those laws reasonable or not -- are binding for all Israel. As Maimonides put it in the Laws of the Disobedient, 1:1-2: "The Supreme Beit Din in Jerusalem is the basis of the Oral Torah, they are the pillars of teaching and from them law and justice spread to all Israel. About them the Torah promised, 'According to the Torah they will teach you,' which is a positive commandment, and everyone who believes in Moses our teacher and his Torah is obligated to rely upon them in all religious practices.

Whoever does not follow their instruction violates a negative commandment, as is said: 'Do not deviate from what they instruct you, neither to the right hand nor to the left'... The matters they learn from tradition, which are the Oral Torah, as well as the matters they learn on their own in one of the methods of the Torah's exegesis, if they see the issue this way or that, as well as the matters where they made a fence around the Torah according to what the situation demands, which are the edicts, and the regulations and the customs -- in each and every one of these three categories, it is a positive commandment to obey them [the Sages], and whoever violates one of these laws, violates a negative commandment [of the Torah]. The Scripture says, 'According to the verdict of law which they teach you' -- these are the regulations and the edicts and the customs, which they teach people to strengthen the religion and to put the world aright; 'And according to the judgment which they tell you' -- these are the matters they learn from the Law in one of the methods of the Torah's exegesis; 'From what they instruct you' -- this is the tradition they received one from another."

It is interesting to note that Maimonides here calls only those laws which are "learned from tradition" "the Oral Torah," while the laws derived by the Sages through the Torah's exegesis he calls "matters they learned on their own." This fits Maimonides's view, expressed in the second root in his Sefer HaMitzvot, where he called the laws learned by the Sages from the Torah through one of the 13 methods of the Torah's exegesis "the laws of the Sages [derabanan]," as opposed to "the laws of the Torah [deorayta]," which are only those laws received explicitly through tradition from Sinai. On the other hand, Maimonides did not include laws learned by the Sages through the Torah's exegesis in the same category as laws which are pure Rabbinic innovations -- edicts, regulations and customs. To Maimonides, apparently, there are three categories of Halachic laws:

1. "The laws of the Torah" in the narrow sense of the term -- i.e. the laws which are either written explicitly in the Torah text or were given orally as they are to Moses at Sinai.

2. The laws that are potentially included in the Torah text, but which require derivation from the text through one of the methods of the Torah's exegesis -- what the Talmud calls "[a law] whose essence is from the Torah and was interpreted by the Sages" (Sanhedrin 88b).

3. The laws which are completely Rabbinic innovations -- there is no basis for them in the Torah text, but the Sages established them of their own considerations.

It may be disputed whether Maimonides views laws of the second category as similar to the laws of the Torah or to the laws of the Sages in practical Halachic matters (or maybe sometimes they are similar to these and sometimes similar to those) -- but anyway, in Maimonides' view the Torah commands us to obey the Sages' rulings from any of these three categories. This commandment he learns from the following verses: "If there is a matter, the judgment of which is hidden from you, between blood and blood, between lawsuit and lawsuit, between affliction and affliction, being matters of controversy within your gates, then you shall arise, and ascend to the place which the Lord your G-d will choose. And you shall come to the priests the Levites, and to the judge that will be in those days, and inquire; and they will tell you the verdict of judgment. And you shall do according to the verdict which they will tell you at that place which the Lord will choose, and you shall be strict to do according to all that they teach you. According to the verdict of law which they teach you, and according to the judgment which they tell you, you shall do: do not deviate from what they instruct you, neither to the right hand nor to the left." (Deuteronomy 17:8-11)

Now, the simple reading of these verses yields something quite different from what Maimonides purports them to say. It speaks here of a person or a group of persons who do not know what the law is in a specific situation which has become matter of public dispute -- "being matters of controversy within your gates." Such persons are commanded to go to the Beit Din sitting "in the place which the Lord your G-d will choose." There they are taught the law, from which they have no right to deviate. Thus, the only authority the Torah explicitly gives the Supreme Beit Din here is that of an arbitrator solving legal issues which become matters of public dispute. Nothing is said of legislative activity such as introducing new laws, be it through exegesis of the Torah or as Rabbinic edicts or regulations.

For example, according to Maimonides, the law that a woman may be betrothed with money is "the words of the Sages" (Laws of Interpersonal Relations 1:2), and in his responsa (paragraph 355) he explained that it is so because this law was not given to Moses at Sinai, but the Sages learned it later on their own through comparison of two Torah verses, as explained in the Talmud (Kiddushin 2a). At a certain point in time the Sages came and introduced a new law, unknown before - that a woman may be betrothed with money. This is a legislative action, and the verses of Deuteronomy 17 seem to give the Sages no authority for such activity.

Moreover, Maimonides's exegesis of the verses of Deuteronomy 17 ("'According to the verdict of law which they teach you' -- these are the regulations and the edicts and the customs... 'And according to the judgment which they tell you' -- these are the matters they learn from the Law in one of the methods of the Torah's exegesis; 'From what they instruct you' -- this is the tradition they received one from another") seems to be his own interpretation, as it is not found in the Judaic sources preceding Maimonides's time.

On the other hand, several Scriptural commentators tried to deduce the Sages' authority to issue Halachic verdicts, even if they contradict the plain meaning of the Torah and common sense, from the phrase "Do not deviate from what they instruct you, neither to the right hand nor to the left." This view is explained most fully in Nachmanides' commentary on Deuteronomy 17:11: "'Neither to the right hand nor to the left' -- even if he [a sage] tells you that right is left or left is right, thus Rashi commented. And it means: even if you think in your heart that they [the Sages] are wrong and the matter is clear for you as the difference between your right and left hands is clear, do as they command you. And do not say, 'How will I eat this completely forbidden tallow?' or 'How will I kill this innocent man?' but say: 'This is what He who gives the commandments commanded me, that in all the matters concerning His commandments I should do as those who stand before Him in the place He had chosen instruct me...'

And this commandment [to obey the Sages] is of a very great necessity, for the Torah was given to us written, and it is known that human opinions would not be the same in all the outcomes [of what is written], and disagreements would multiply until our Torah would become several different torahs. That is why the Scripture gave us the law to obey the Supreme Beit Din which stands before G-d in the place He had chosen, in everything they tell us interpreting the Torah -- be it an exegesis they received through tradition from Moses and from the Divine, or anything they say from their understanding of the Scripture's meaning or intention -- for according to their opinion He gives us the Torah, even if they seem to you mistaking right for left -- and all the more so if they say right is right -- for G-d's spirit is upon those serving in His Temple and He will not abandon His pious men, so they will forever be saved from error and obstacle."

Regardless of any "great necessity" that one may or may not see in it, the phrase "Do not deviate from what they instruct you, neither to the right hand nor to the left" does not necessarily mean what Rashi and Nachmanides claim. It only means that after one asked the Sages' verdict on an unclear matter, he should not deviate from this verdict. Neither Rashi nor Nachmanides (nor Midrash Sifri on Deuteronomy, section 154, from which they took this viewpoint) explain the reason for this exegesis -- yet I have already shown that any exegesis should be examined on the grounds of its reason and the logical arguments in favor of it, at least while the Sages' authority to give this exegesis a mandatory status is unproven - and one cannot consider it proven whilst trying to prove it as Sifri, Rashi, and Nachmanides do. Thus, the only source for Rabbinic authority becomes the Rabbis' own understanding, highly creative, of a Biblical verse.

Moreover, there is a contradictory Tannaitic interpretation of "Neither to the right hand nor to the left," to be found in the Jerusalem Talmud (Tractate Horayot 1:1): "As we have learned from the Tannaim: is it possible that when they [the Sages] tell you that right is left you would obey them? Of this it is said, 'to go left and right' -- only when they tell you right is right and left is left." This alternative reading only sanctions Rabbinic legislation if it squares with logic. It is up to someone else to pass judgement about whether the Sages' right is, indeed, right.

You are quite right about pointing out the dispute between the Midrash Sifri and Jerusalem Talmud about the meaning of “Neither to the right hand nor to the left”. But rather than responding to that question, and the other questions you brought up, right here, I will come back to them after responding to the next set of questions, which are extensions of these ones.