However, the questions raised in the above
passage are not the main point. The main point is that, as we all know,
tradition may well become distorted or forgotten, especially over the course of
the 1500 years between Moses and Rabbi Judah HaNasi. The Tosfot, as said above,
explicitly admitted this. Therefore it is peculiar that Maimonides was so
persuaded tradition could be the only reason for the lack of dispute amongst
Chazal on certain laws that he even ruled: "When one says, 'This is what I
received from tradition,' it should not be disputed."
Do we simply rely on the personal integrity of
each and every one of our rabbis? This seems most problematic -- not only
because for common sense plausibility one should require matters not be
dependent solely on the personal virtues and abilities of specific people, but
also because we have found certain rabbis' concepts of the truth do not square
with our notions of fact and historicity: "So we find that truth is whatever leads
to good and to the will of the Creator, while lie is whatever bring success to
the business of the Master of Lies, he on the other side [Sitra Achra]."
(Rabbi E. E. Dessler, "Michtav MiEliyahu,"
v. 1, p. 94)
"It is written in the commentary of the
disciples of Rabbeynu Jonah on Tractate Berachot... about what Rabbi Jochanan
said (in Sanhedrin 42a), that everyone who blesses the new moon on time, it is
as though he saw the Divine Presence: 'For despite the fact we cannot see G-d
with our own eyes, we can see Him through His great deeds and wonders... Here
also, because He renews the months, He thus reveals Himself to people, and it
is as though they saw really His face; this is what I heard from the rabbi, my
teacher [i.e. Rabbeynu Jonah himself].'... And despite the fact that all this
comes from an erroneous supposition -- for a wise person who knows the
calculations also understands the moon's trajectory, and he knows that it also
moves in a constant movement and does not deviate from its trajectory even for
a moment -- anyway, from what people conclude from superficial knowledge, they
come to recognition of G-d, blessed be He. Chazal pointed out the great value
of this recognition, derived only from superficial knowledge and from a lack of
analysis, until they said that such a person is like one who sees the Divine
Presence...
That is, because by this error one recognizes
G-d, of what importance is the fact that it is an error? ...And because after
all, this error brings to the true purpose and there is no other way that one
could obtain the true recognition, we should conclude that this error is the
only way to achieve the true purpose. In this case, it is really the true way,
and one may not call it a 'lie'. For the difference between a lie and the
truth is measured by the outcome of the things that result -- and if the
outcome is true, the means by which that true outcome was obtained are also
true."
(Rabbi Yerucham of Mir, Daat Chochma UMussar,
v. 1, p. 113)
That is, first we define what truth is
(regardless of factual reality) and then we judge statements as being true or
false based solely on whether or not they lead to the conclusions which satisfy
us. "The end justifies the means."
Of course, people may lie occasionally out of
weakness. But the authors cited above speak of a principle -- that
lies should be considered truth if they lead to a desirable outcome. And these
authors are considered Torah greats and are role models for many religious Jews
in recent generations. If this is the moral philosophy of our contemporary
Torah greats, who can guarantee that in previous generations the outlook was
any different? And if it was not, how can I rely on things they introduced as
"tradition"? It may well be that they made those things up to bring
the Jews closer "to the good and to the will of the Creator," and in
that case it is conceivable that they would find no obstacle in describing
their own innovations as "tradition which starts from Moses and the Sinai
Revelation."
On the other hand, I can cite early sources that give off the
opposite impression. To give but one example, from the Mishna in Eidiyot
(5:6-7): “Akavya Ben Mehalalel testified to four things. [The Sages] told him,
“Akavya, recant from these four things that you teach, and we will make you the
Av Beth Din (foremost leader) of Israel.” He replied to them, “I prefer to be
called a fool for the rest of my life, then to be considered a sinner before
G-d, that people shouldn't say, ‘he recanted to gain his position.’” ... At the
time of his passing, he told his son, “My son, recant from the four things that
I used to teach.” [His son] replied, “Why didn't you recant from them?”
[Akavya] told him, “I heard [these teachings] from the majority, and [my
collegues] also heard [their teachings] from the majority. I [therefore] stood
by the teachings that I had received, and they stood by the teachings that they
had received. But you only heard [one opinion about these four things] from a
minority opinion (myself), while you heard [an opposing opinion about these
four things] from the majority opinion. It is [therefore] better to leave the
opinion of the minority, and to accept the opinion of the majority.” [His son]
requested, “Instruct your collegues regarding me [that they should accept me].”
[Akavya] told him, “I will not instruct [them].” [His son] asked him, “Perhaps
[you decline to do so] because you have found fault with me.” [Akavya] replied,
“No, [but it depends on you], your actions shall draw you close [to them], and
your actions shall draw you away [from them].”
I was personally brought up with that approach – that the truth
remains the truth and that falsehood remains falsehood, and that there is no
justification for projecting an untruth even for noble purposes (except for
darkei shalom).
All I can say, is that from my understanding Jewish history,
I believe that the values of most of the leaders of previous generations (especially
from 400 years ago, and earlier) are generally in alignment with the values of
the Mishna I quoted from above.
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